

Lutamos por uma banca saudável e solidária. Lideramos o melhor sistema de saúde em Portugal. Gostamos de coisas boas e com estilo. De produtos e serviços únicos. De pessoas com convicções e de uma boa conversa. De vinhos bons, que não têm que ser caros. Gostamos do ar livre, do mar e do sol. Do design e boa arquitectura. Achamos que a Economia, Política e a Fé (seja lá o que isso for) fazem o mundo girar. Adoramos o Benfica. Amamos os nossos filhos.
Mui excelentes leitores
Será no próximo dia 29 de Março, quinta-feira, pelas 18h30-20h00 que eu e o Doutor Bruno Valverde Cota lançaremos o livro "Marketing Inovador".
No Palácio Belmonte, em lugar de eleição.
Páteo Dom Fradique,14
1100-624 LISBOA
Teremos um BusShuttle para levar os interessados entre o parque de estacionamento (Portas do Sol) e o Palácio.
Reservem na vossa agenda.
Faremos da ocasião uma oportunidade para nos revermos e convivermos.
Dois ilustres amigos (Professores Doutores Carlos Zorrinho e João Borges Assunção) farão uma alocução a que se seguirão tb breves intervenções dos dois autores e a habitual sessão de autógrafos.
Cumprimentos afectuosos e todos estão convidados para se juntarem a nós no dia 29.03.2007 em Lisboa.
Companies cannot achieve superior and lasting business performance simply by following a specific set of steps.
Phil Rosenzweig
2007 Number 1
The quest of every high-quality corporate executive is to find the keys to superior performance. Achieving market leadership is hard enough, but staying at the top—given intense competition, rapidly changing technology, and shifting global forces—is even more difficult. At the same time, executives are under enormous pressure to deliver profitable growth and high returns for their shareholders. No wonder they constantly search for ways to achieve competitive advantage.
But many executives, despite their good intentions, look in the wrong places for the insights that will deliver an edge. Too often they reach for books and articles that promise a reliable path to high performance. Over the past decade, some of the most popular business books have claimed to reveal the blueprint for lasting success, the way to go from good to great, or how to craft a fail-safe strategy or to make the competition irrelevant.
At first glance, many of the pronouncements in such works look entirely credible. They are based on extensive data and appear to be the result of rigorous analysis. Millions of managers read them, eager to apply these keys to success to their own companies. Unfortunately, many of the studies are deeply flawed and based on questionable data that can lead to erroneous conclusions. Worse, they give rise to the especially grievous notion that business success follows predictably from implementing a few key steps. In promoting this idea, authors obscure a more basic truth—namely, that in the business world success is the result of decisions made under conditions of uncertainty and shaped in part by factors outside our control. In the real world, given the flux of competitive dynamics, even seemingly good choices do not always lead to favorable outcomes.
Rather than succumb to the hyperbole and false promises found in so much management writing, business strategists would do far better to improve their powers of critical thinking. Wise executives should be able to think clearly about the quality of research claims and to detect some of the egregious errors that pervade the business world. Indeed, the capacity for critical thinking is an important asset for any business strategist—one that allows the executive to cut through the clutter and to discard the delusions, embracing instead a more realistic understanding of business success and failure.
As a first step, it’s important to identify some of the misperceptions and delusions commonly found in the business world. Then, using these insights, we might replace flawed thinking with a more acute method of approaching strategic decisions.
Many studies of company performance are undermined by a problem known as the halo effect. First identified by US psychologist Edward Thorndike in 1920, it describes the tendency to make specific inferences on the basis of a general impression.
How does the halo effect manifest itself in the business world? Imagine a company that is doing well, with rising sales, high profits, and a sharply increasing stock price. The tendency is to infer that the company has a sound strategy, a visionary leader, motivated employees, an excellent customer orientation, a vibrant culture, and so on. But when that same company suffers a decline—if sales fall and profits shrink—many people are quick to conclude that the company’s strategy went wrong, its people became complacent, it neglected its customers, its culture became stodgy, and more. In fact, these things may not have changed much, if at all. Rather, company performance, good or bad, creates an overall impression—a halo—that shapes how we perceive its strategy, leaders, employees, culture, and other elements.
As an example, when Cisco Systems was growing rapidly, in the late 1990s, it was widely praised by journalists and researchers for its brilliant strategy, masterful management of acquisitions, and superb customer focus. When the tech bubble burst, many of the same observers were quick to make the opposite attributions: Cisco, the journalists and researchers claimed, now had a flawed strategy, haphazard acquisition management, and poor customer relations. On closer examination, Cisco really had not changed much—a decline in its performance led people to see the company differently. Indeed, Cisco staged a remarkable turnaround and today is still one of the leading tech companies. The same thing happened at ABB, the Swiss-Swedish engineering giant. In the 1990s, when its performance was strong, ABB was lauded for its elegant matrix design, risk-taking culture, and charismatic chief executive, Percy Barnevik. Later, when the company’s performance fell, ABB was roundly criticized for having a dysfunctional organization, a chaotic culture, and an arrogant CEO. But again, the company had not really changed much.
The fact is that many everyday concepts in business—including leadership, corporate culture, core competencies, and customer orientation—are ambiguous and difficult to define. We often infer perceptions of them from something else, which appears to be more concrete and tangible: namely, financial performance. As a result, many of the things that we commonly believe are contributions to company performance are in fact attributions. In other words, outcomes can be mistaken for inputs.
Wise managers know to be wary of the halo effect. They look for independent evidence rather than merely accepting the idea that a successful company has a visionary leader and a superb customer orientation or that a struggling company must have a poor strategy and weak execution. They ask themselves, “If I didn’t know how the company was performing, what would I think about its culture, execution, or customer orientation?” They know that as long as their judgments are merely attributions reflecting a company’s performance, their logic will be circular.
The halo effect is especially damaging because it often compromises the quality of data used in research. Indeed, many studies of business performance—as well as some articles that have appeared in journals such as Harvard Business Review and The McKinsey Quarterly and in academic business journals—rely on data contaminated by the halo effect. These studies praise themselves for the vast amount of data they have accrued but overlook the fact that if the data aren’t valid, it really doesn’t matter how much was gathered or how sophisticated the analysis appears to be.
This reliance on questionable data, in turn, gives rise to a number of further errors in logic. Two delusions—of absolute performance and of lasting success—have particularly serious repercussions for business strategists.
One of the most seductive claims in business best sellers is that a company can achieve success if it follows a specific set of steps. Some recent books are explicit on this point, claiming that a company hewing to a certain formula is virtually sure to become a great performer. On closer inspection these studies rely on sources of data (including retrospective interviews, articles from the business press, and business school case studies) that are routinely undermined by the halo effect. Whereas a given set of factors may appear to have led predictably to success, the reverse is more likely—it would be more accurate to say that successful companies tended to be described in the same way. The direction of causality is wrong.
Following a given formula can’t ensure high performance, and for a simple reason: in a competitive market economy, performance is fundamentally relative, not absolute. Success and failure depend not only on a company’s actions but also on those of its rivals. A company can improve its operations in many ways—better quality, lower cost, faster throughput time, superior asset management, and more—but if rivals improve at a faster rate, its performance may suffer.
Consider General Motors. In 2005 GM’s debt was reduced to junk bond status—hardly a vote of confidence from financial markets. Yet compared with the automobiles GM produced in the 1980s, its cars today boast better quality, additional features, superior comfort, and improved safety. Owing to myriad factors, including the increased prominence of Japanese and South Korean automakers, GM’s share of the US market keeps slipping, from 35 percent in 1990 to 29 percent in 1999 and 25 percent in 2005. Its declining performance must be understood in relative terms. Paradoxi-cally, the rigors of competition from Asian automakers are precisely what have stimulated GM to improve. Is GM a better automaker than it was a generation ago? Yes, if we look at absolute measures. But that’s little comfort to its employees or shareholders.
The delusion of absolute performance is very important because it suggests that a company can achieve high performance by following a simple formula, regardless of the actions of competitors. If left unchecked, executives may avoid decisions that, although risky, could be essential for success. Once we see that performance is relative, however, it becomes obvious that a company can never achieve success simply by following certain steps, no matter how serious its intentions. High performance comes from doing things better than rivals can, which means that managers have to take risks. This uncomfortable truth recognizes that some elements of business performance are beyond our control, yet it is an essential concept that clear-thinking executives must grasp.
The halo effect leads to a second misconception about the performance of companies: that they can achieve enduring success in a predictable way. These studies typically begin by selecting a group of companies that have outperformed the market for many years and then gather data to try and distill what led to that high performance. Regrettably, however, much of the data come from sources that are commonly contaminated by the halo effect. What the authors claim to be the causes of long-term performance are more accurately understood as attributions made about companies that had been selected precisely for their long-term performance.
In fact, lasting success is largely a delusion, a statistical anomaly. As McKinsey’s Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan showed,1 corporate longevity is neither very likely nor, when we find it, generally associated with high performance. On the whole, if we look at the full population of companies over time, there’s a strong tendency for extreme performance in one time period to be followed by less extreme performance in the next. Suggesting that companies can follow a blueprint to achieve lasting success may be appealing, but it’s not supported by the evidence.
High performance is difficult for companies to maintain, for an obvious reason: in a free-market economy, profits tend to decline as a result of imitation and competition. Rivals copy the leader’s winning ways, new companies enter the market, best practices are diffused, and employees move from one company to another. Of course, it is always possible to pick out a handful of enduring success stories after the fact. Then if we study those companies by relying on data that are suffused with the halo effect, we may think we have discovered the keys to success. In fact, we have only managed to show how successful companies were described—an entirely different matter.
The delusion of lasting success is a serious matter because it casts building an enduringly high-performing company as an achievable objective. Yet companies that outperform the market for long periods of time are not just rare but statistical anomalies whose apparent greatness is observable only in retrospect. More accurately, companies that enjoy long-term success have probably done so by stringing together many short-term successes, not because they somehow unlocked the secrets of sustained greatness. Unfortunately, pursuing a dream of enduring greatness may divert attention from the need to win more immediate battles.
These points, taken together, expose the principal fiction at the heart of so many popular business books and articles: that following a few key steps will inevitably lead to greatness and that a company’s success is of its own making and not often shaped by external factors.
The simple fact is that no formula can guarantee a company’s success, at least not in a competitive business environment. This truth may seem disappointing. Many managers would like to find a formula that can be easily applied—a tidy plug-and-play solution that ensures success. But on reflection, the absence of a simple success formula should not be disappointing at all. Indeed, it might even come as a relief. If success could be reduced to a formula, companies would not need strategic thinking but could rely on administrators to tick the right boxes and ensure that formulas were followed with precision. What makes strategic decision making so difficult, and therefore so valuable to companies, is precisely that there are no guaranteed keys to success. The ability to make the sorts of difficult, complex judgments that are pivotal for a company’s fortunes is, in the last analysis, a business executive’s most important contribution. Here are some approaches that may help.
Rather than search in vain for success formulas, business executives would do better to adjust their thinking about the context of strategic decisions. As a first step, they should recognize the fundamental uncertainty of the business world. Doing so does not come naturally. People want the world to make sense, to be predictable, and to follow clear rules of cause and effect. Managers want to believe that their business world is similarly predictable, that specific actions will lead to certain outcomes. Yet strategic choice is inevitably an exercise in decision making under uncertainty. Another source of uncertainty involves customers: will they embrace or reject a new product or service? Even if a company accurately anticipates what customers will do, it has to contend with the unpredictable actions of new and old competitors.
A third source of uncertainty comes from technological change. Whereas some industries are relatively stable, with products that don’t change much and customer demand that remains fairly steady, others change rapidly and in unpredictable ways. A final source of uncertainty concerns internal capabilities. Managers can’t tell exactly how a company—with its particular people, skills, and experiences—will respond to a new course of action. Our best efforts to isolate and understand the inner workings of organizations will be moderately successful at best. Combine these factors and it becomes clear why strategy involves decisions made under uncertainty.
Faced with this basic uncertainty, wise managers approach problems as interlocking probabilities. Their objective is not to find keys to guaranteed success but to improve the odds through a thoughtful consideration of factors. Some of these are outside the company—including industry forces, customer trends, and the intentions of competitors. Others are internal—capabilities, resources, and risk preferences. On the foundation of that analysis, the role of the business strategist is to make decisions that improve a company’s chances for success while never imagining that a company can simply will its success.
Rather, the goal should be gathering accurate information and subjecting it to careful scrutiny in order to improve the odds of success. As former US Treasury Secretary and Goldman Sachs executive Robert E. Rubin wrote in his memoirs,2 “Once you’ve internalized the concept that you can’t prove anything in absolute terms, life becomes all the more about odds, chances, and trade-offs. In a world without provable truths, the only way to refine the probabilities that remain is through greater knowledge and understanding.” Wise managers know that business is about finding ways to improve the odds of success—but never imagine that it is a certainty.
Finally, clear-thinking executives know that in an uncertain world, actions and outcomes are imperfectly linked. It’s easy to infer that good outcomes result from good decisions and that bad outcomes must mean someone blundered. Yet the fact that a given choice didn’t turn out well doesn’t always mean it was a mistake. Therefore it’s important to examine the decision process itself and not just the outcome. Had the right information been gathered or had some important data been overlooked? Were the assumptions reasonable or were they flawed? Were calculations accurate or had there been errors? Had the full set of eventualities been identified and their impact estimated? Had the company’s strategic position and risk preference been considered properly?
This sort of rigorous analysis, with outcomes separated from inputs, requires the extra mental step of judging actions on their merits rather than simply making after-the-fact attributions, favorable or unfavorable. Good decisions don’t always lead to favorable outcomes, and unfavorable outcomes are not always the result of mistakes. Wise managers resist the natural tendency to make attributions based solely on outcomes. They avoid the halo bestowed by performance and insist on independent evidence.
Our business world is full of research and analysis that are comforting to managers: that success can be yours by following a formula, that specific actions will lead to predictable outcomes, and that greatness can be achieved no matter what rivals do. The truth is very different: the business world is not a place of clear causal relationships, where a given set of actions leads to predictable results, but one that is more tenuous and uncertain.
The task of strategic leadership is therefore not to follow a given formula or set of steps. Instead it is to gather appropriate information, evaluate it thoughtfully, and make choices that provide the best chance for the company to succeed, all the while recognizing the fundamental nature of business uncertainty. Paradoxically, a sober understanding of this risk—along with an appreciation of the relative nature of performance and the general tendency for performance to regress—may offer the best basis for guiding effective decisions. These complex decisions, made without any guarantee of success, are ultimately the main contribution of business strategists. If a set of steps that could guarantee success did exist, and if greatness were indeed simply a matter of will, then the value of clear thinking in business would be lower, not greater. ![]()
Phil Rosenzweig is a professor of strategy and international management at the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), in Lausanne, Switzerland.
This article is adapted from The Halo Effect: . . . and the Eight Other Business Delusions That Deceive Managers, New York: Free Press, 2007.
1 Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform the Market—and How to Successfully Transform Them, New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001.
2 Robert E. Rubin and Jacob Weisberg, In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington, reprint edition, New York: Random House, 2004.
Location: New York
Author: Shahin Shojai
Date: Wednesday, February 21, 2007
These days the U.K. press is inundated with commentaries about how the banking industry is abusing its powerful position to overcharge the U.K. citizens. And, it seems that the banking industry is very good at helping ensure bad news stays in the public domain, through trickling of announcements about new charges.
It is astonishing just how bad our industry is at marketing itself and managing how announcements are managed. Very few banking institutions take time to think about how their actions might be perceived in the marketplace and work to ensure that their message gets across effectively to the public at large.
The real problem started when credit card companies, mostly part of the major banking institutions, were accused of charging very hefty fees for late payments, something they should have been able to defend had they taken the time to prepare an adequate response.
Instead, they waited until they were attacked by the regulators and were subsequently forced to reduce their fees. The perception in the market was that they knew they were overcharging their customers but just waited till the last minute before they reduced them.
As a result of the cut in penalty fees, the banking institutions started treating their retail customers just like many of their U.S. peers used to treat their corporate customers subsequent to the departure of the Japanese banks from the U.S. markets.
The way the U.S. corporate bankers dealt with their customers was to suggest a basis point figure that they needed to be covered in order to deal with a company, for example 90 to 100 basis points was one that I had heard a lot while advising major U.S. corporations. Of course, bigger corporations were able to reduce this figure, but their negotiating positions were weakened by the shrinking number of banks they could deal with, especially if they wished to bank with two or three banks on a global basis.
The retail banks are now behaving the same way. They are telling their retail clients that they have set themselves a target for profitability growth, and judging by today’s announcement by Barclays Plc it seems to be huge, and that it is their responsibility to help the banks achieve it.
If they cannot cover this target by the penalty charges for late payments or unapproved overdraft charges then they have to pay for basic banking services, such as having a current account. Now, the fact that most other European banks charge for basic banking services should mean that such a decision would not cause too much negative publicity.
But the way this has been managed has placed the banks in a very awkward position. They wish to do something to make up for the shortfall in penalty fees but they just do not know how to, so instead of taking an industry wide initiative to ensure that any announcements are taken in tandem, each bank announces a different kind of fee each week.
The fact is that as far as the customers are concerned they do not differentiate between which banks are introducing which fees, what they hear is that with each announcement a member of the banking community is introducing new charges, including a recent announcement by a card company that they wish to charge £10 for credit balances.
I believe that the banking community needs to wake up and realize that they are now a much more integral part of the retail world than they think they are. They are members of the retail community as far as most of their clients are concerned, and not just the backbone of the process through which their customers make payments for goods and services.
It is time that the banking industry realizes there is a reason that the value of their brands is so low. Looking at the Interbrand ranking of the top 100 world brands in 2006, which I must admit I am not so sure about their methodology, one finds that no financial institution is in the top 10 and that the combined value of the brands of the 9 banks that make it into the top 100 is less than the combined value of the top two global brands (Coca Cola and Microsoft).
In fact, if you remove the names of the world’s leading investments banks – namely, JP Morgan (although Chase is the owner, JP Morgan is more associated with the name of the investment bank than the retail bank), Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch – the 5 remaining banks have a brand market capitalization which is less than Coca Cola.
There is no doubt that the world’s leading banking institutions need to do a lot more to increase the value of their brands. They need to realize that they need to spend as much time as their retail peers in increasing their exposures and how they manage the messages that come out of their marketing departments. Weekly announcements of new charges in such a competitive environment is just not the way to go about building a reputation for a bank.
Location: New York
Author: Ken Silverstein, EnergyBiz Insider, Editor-in-Chief
Date: Tuesday, February 20, 2007
By nearly all accounts, the accident in March 1979 is one of the primary impediments to a nuclear renaissance. While the thought of radiation escaping into the atmosphere is well-appreciated, it is the function of policymakers and utility officials -- and the reporters assigned to cover them -- to effectively communicate their message so as to properly inform the public.
Fears of a "hydrogen bubble" in which radioactive material could devastate the surrounding Pennsylvania towns were palpable. But neither government nor industry could organize a response to quell the unease. Reporters, meantime, gravitated toward those with the most hyperbolic views.
"There was so much speculation and it was all fueled by people who didn't have a background in nuclear technology," says George Koodray, who managed a radio news station near the plant. Koodray, who now is a communications pro in New Jersey, says he has since spent years trying to "undo the damage" that he helped create.
"There were dramatic images of corporate conspiracies -- all supported by events within a time period in which there were oil interruptions and a blockbuster movie called `China Syndrome,' Koodray adds. "Reporters back then were exposed to atom bombs and mushroom clouds and they felt that the plant could go off like a nuclear bomb."
Three Mile Island has made an indelible mark on American energy policy. While 103 nuclear reactors are operating here, none have been ordered in the United States since the 1970s. Even before the scare, India successfully tested a nuclear device in 1974 and gave rise to fears over global nuclear proliferation.
The same trepidation is around today. But, there is now a strong emphasis on reducing greenhouse gas emissions while trying to diversify the nation's energy mix. That's why the U.S. government is offering billions in incentives to expand nuclear energy, which has resulted in the consideration of about 30 such plants.
Real Panic
Before that would occur, the industry must explain what went wrong in Unit 2 on March 28, 1979 and what it has learned in the intervening years. Around 4 a.m. that day, following a loss of feedwater flow, a primary coolant system relief valve lifted and failed to shut. This resulted in a loss of primary coolant, uncovering the reactor core and causing a partial core meltdown. While the matter took 14 years and $1 billion to clean up, the second of the two units, Unit 1, remains operational today.
Faulty equipment meant to detect the malfunction is partially to blame. But, a lack of emergency training along with disparate communications compounded the whole mess. By 7 a.m. that same morning, panic had arisen over a "hydrogen bubble" that could explode.
The terror only escalated when the facility's owner, Metropolitan Edison, told the public it didn't feel as if it had to report every nuance of the situation. Pennsylvania's governor also complained that he was unable to get answers, all of which led to five frightful days in which areas as far as 300 miles away from Harrisburg were advised they might need to evacuate. Calm would not prevail until President Carter came to reassure the people.
"There was a clamor to get out of D.C.," says Jeff Dennard, president of his own consulting firm in Warwick, R.I. In 1979, he headed media relations for a former congressman from New Mexico before going on to run a communications division for the parent of Three Mile Island. "It felt like every person for themselves."
The fright was no doubt bona fide. But the reality is that hydrogen in the core could not congeal and explode; rather, it would safely combine with oxygen. And while state leaders and utility officials can be faulted for not having emergency preparedness plans, many in the media failed to ensure knowledgeable sources were given a proper forum -- experts, who from day one, were saying radiation levels were not harmful.
The press, unfortunately, is often behind the curve. It's a problem partly of its own making as many organizations are more intent on focusing on the sensational instead of matters of real substance. In the case of Three Mile Island, more journalists should have departed from the herd. Reporters should have been talking not just to activists but also to nuclear scientists and engineers who could separate fact from fiction.
The goal is to get to the truth, not obscure it. Conflicting messages from a variety of sources contributed to the public's fear. And while radiation was released from the plant, it never presented any dangers to the surrounding areas -- all confirmed after endless environmental investigations and legal challenges. Despite the melting of about one-third of the fuel core, the reactor vessel contained the damage and no one was hurt or killed.
The PR Battle
Winning the ongoing PR battle is atop the nuclear industry's agenda. To do so, companies such as General Electric, Areva NP and Westinghouse are developing state-of-the art reactors that have multiple safety measures and are designed to cope with any sudden loss of cooling. And over the last 25 years, the industry has performed well and implemented a number of new safety standards, all of which has harnessed increasing public support.
The nuclear industry is known for its technicians and not its media savvy. It must continue to evolve and work toward a culture of openness and accessibility. It must allay legitimate worries and plan for the "unthinkable." While no company can replicate a potential disaster, preparing and practicing for them can mitigate damages. Those at the top must demonstrate empathy and communicate all known facts to address concerns.
"There's a natural tendency when we talk about things that are potentially catastrophic to hide the bad news," says communications expert Dennard. "If there is bad news, get it out as fast as you can and as factually as you know at that moment. Don't get out anything if you do not know."
Three Mile Island taught the nuclear industry, along with the rest of corporate America, to disseminate information during a crisis in a coherent and forthright manner. That apparent inability coupled with the preconceived ideas that reporters had toward nuclear power helped to increase the emotional intensity in March 1979. Now, nearly 28 years later, those powerful feelings are subsiding and giving the industry and the public a chance to reason with one another.
In recent months many have been debating whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been even more damaging to the U.S. financial services industry than the Interest Equalization Tax, which literally handed over the Eurobond markets to London on a platter.
The debates about whether London has, or is about to take over New York City as the world’s leading financial centre has been circulating around the world for a few months now. There is no doubt that London has benefited hugely from international listings by companies who no longer wish to list in the U.S. in order to avoid falling under the auspices of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Now, whether that means that London is now the world’s leading financial centre is another matter. But, what is clear is that unpopular laws can be quite costly to a financial centre or a country.
Similar to the discussions about how London is gaining at NYC’s expense, many are now debating the implications of a socialist victory in France and how some of their tax policies might benefit London. Many are suggesting that should Mme. Ségolène Royal win the French Presidential elections in May and remain true to her word and increase taxes for the high earners and major corporations that many of the best minds in France might leave the country and move to London.
The areas of special concern seem to be financial services and biotechnology sectors, industries in which London has a special strength. According to a recent senate finance committee report, France has lost €2.2bn of taxable assets in 2005 as a result of people leaving the country to avoid paying the wealth tax. This figure is expected to swell should the Socialist party win the election and introduce further tax hikes.
Losing talented individuals to neighbouring countries is nothing new in the world of macroeconomics. The U.S. has prospered mainly as a result of being able to attract the best minds from not only its neighbours to the north but also from most of the rest of the world.
However, what makes today’s world somewhat different from the past is that due to the greater concentration of wealth when countries introduce unfavourable regulations they not only lose many of their most talented individuals, but they also lose a huge chunk of their wealth as well.
Unlike the recent joiners to the European Union, whose citizens seem to be highly mobile, labour mobility among the more established and wealthy members of Europe has historically not been very high. Consequently, countries have not been too successful in attracting the best minds from their neighbours when they introduce regulations that would seem to induce an exodus. As a result, unfavourable regulations have not been too costly.
However, unlike the working or middle-class, the wealthiest members of the society are extremely mobile, and they seem to be in control of ever greater proportion of national wealth. Consequently, when they leave, a greater share of national asset values leaves with them than was the case in the past.
In fact, the wealthiest European are behaving more and more like major global corporations which move their headquarters around Europe in order to benefit from more conducive taxation. Very soon the U.K. might also find itself on the receiving end of the attacks from Europe that Switzerland is currently facing for attracting many U.S. corporations to move their European headquarters there.
If the exodus that many in France are predicting does in deed take place, the U.K. is bound to face huge criticism for having a too lenient a tax system; one that places other European countries, especially France in this case, at an unfair disadvantage.
Now, the fact that the U.K., similar to Switzerland, is only trying to make life easier for her citizens by having a more flexible tax system is obviously beside the point and U.K. will certainly be attacked should the tax hikes result in a loss of wealth to France. The perception is that if we do something that causes our citizens to leave and they do, it is not our fault but the fault of the country to which they are going.
No one in Europe is thinking about maybe reducing their own taxes to become more competitive. They simply view Switzerland as the problem because it has more attractive tax rates, even though as discussed in a previous bulletin, there are many countries in the E.U. that have lower taxes than Switzerland.
Until countries realize the dangers of introducing unfavourable regulatory policies in a world where wealthy individuals and their ever more concentrated capital are highly mobile they will continue to make decisions that makes other countries look more attractive and attack those same countries for not introducing regulations that match the mistake that they have made. France seems to be enroute to proving that point yet again.
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Pedro Magalhães, responsável do Centro de Sondagens e Opinião da Universidade Católica, disse à agência Lusa não querer comentar a afirmação de Jerónimo de Sousa, adiantando tratar-se de coisas da «luta política».
O secretário-geral do PCP, Jerónimo de Sousa, acusou as sondagens da Universidade Católica de serem um instrumento do «não» de modo a dar por adquirida a vitória do «sim», para diminuir o número de pessoas a votar.
«A Universidade católica, que é um instrumento do não, apresentou a espantosa sondagem de 16% de diferença para o sim, pretendendo que as pessoas não votem. Temos que garantir todos os votos, porque em 1998 as sondagens davam a vitória ao sim e depois tal não aconteceu, por um voto se ganha e por um se perde», afirmou, num encontro realizado no Ginásio Atlético Clube, na Baixa da Banheira.
O «sim» no referendo sobre a despenalização do aborto vence nas cinco sondagens publicadas hoje, com diferenças sobre o «não» que vão dos seis aos 21 pontos percentuais e valores da abstenção entre 18 e 45 pontos.
Diário Digital / Lusa
09-02-2007 10:25:48
Neuromarketing
In 2005 and 2006 there was a great deal of interest in neuromarketing and the idea of using fMRI scanners as tools of market research. Could brain scanning replace questionnaires and surveys? Could small groups of consumers in ‘tin cans’ tell us how the population would respond to the latest ideas in TV advertising? Although brain scanning is providing useful insight into how the brain works, and into how some market research techniques work, it is having no impact on the research business as a whole. For most research problems brain scanning is too slow, too expensive, and insufficiently available.